What to Read in The Hindu Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: ​The legality of Israeli actions under international law 

Context

Grave violations by regimes must be condemned, as international law remains the key standard for judging state actions.

Introduction

Many countries hesitate to take a clear stand on whether Israel’s military strikes on Iran are legal, but the key question before the international community is whether these actions comply with international law. The UN Charter, particularly Article 2(4), bans the use of force in international relations, except in specific cases like self-defence under Article 51. However, this exception is tightly defined.

• Article 51permits self-defence only if an armed attack occurs, and the response must meet necessity and proportionality.
• According to international lawyer Marko Milanovic, the legality of using force depends on how self-defenceis interpreted.
• If self-defence applies only to actual armed attacks, Israel’s strike is unlawful, as no direct armed attackfrom Iran or its legally attributable actors took place.
• Under this view, Israel’s use of force amounts to aggression.
• Aggressionis defined as a war crime under international law.

Pre-emptive self-defence

• Israel claims its military action against Iran is pre-emptive self-defence, targeting Iran’s nuclear weapons programme.
• The argument: Iran is close to developing nuclear weapons and has threatened Israel, thus justifying an anticipatory strike.
• This raises a legal question: Can a country use force beforean actual armed attack?
• Article 51of the UN Charter only allows self-defence after an armed attack has occurred — pre-emptive action contradicts this.
• However, legal scholars like Rosalyn Higginsargue that waiting for an actual attack may be impractical in modern warfare.
• Assuming pre-emptive self-defence is allowed, its scope must be narrowly definedto prevent abuse.
• A more acceptable term is anticipatory self-defence, supported by the Caroline Incident (1837).
• According to the Caroline doctrine, force may be used only when:
  • The threat is instant and overwhelming
  • There is no alternativeand no time for deliberation
  • The response is proportionate

Legal Concepts Related to Self-Defence

Concept	Definition	Legal Status under International Law	Example / Reference
Self-defence	Use of force in response to an actual armed attack	Permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter	Israel after rocket attacks
Pre-emptive self-defence	Use of force against a future, potential attack	Controversial, generally considered illegal	Israel’s claim against Iran
Anticipatory self-defence	Use of force when an attack is imminent	Conditionally accepted under Caroline doctrine	Caroline Incident (1837)

• Pre-emptive self-defenceremains legally and morally contested.
• If permitted, its application must meet strict criteria: immediacy, necessity, and proportionality.
• Overbroad usewould undermine the UN Charter and risk legalising aggression.

Interpretations of ‘Imminent’

Type	Explanation	Implications
Restrictive (Temporal)	– Attack is about to happen. – Focuses on temporal proximity.	– Aligns with traditional international law. – Supports limited self-defence.
Expansive	– Attack could happen at some point in future. – Not temporally bound.	– Risks unilateral action by powerful states. – Encourages armed aggression.

Key Legal Objections to Expansive Meaning

• Violates UN Charter principleson the prohibition of use of force.
• Undermines international peace and securityby allowing conjecture-based action.
• Contradicts the Caroline doctrine, which sets stringent conditions for self-defence:
  • Must be instant
  • Overwhelming
  • Leave no room for deliberation
• Widespread support for a narrower, restrictiveinterpretation of ‘imminent’.
• Ensures restraint, and upholds sovereignty and legal safeguards.

Application to Israel-Iran Context

Israel’s Claim	Legal Evaluation
Pre-emptive self-defence against Iran’s nuclear threat	– Fails to meet the restrictive test of imminence. – Based on potential future threat, not an imminent one.
Assertion of existential threat due to nuclear progress	– Relies on expansive meaning, which is unsupported in international law.

Conclusion

Skeptics may contend that discussing such issues is pointless in a world where international law is frequently disregarded. They often highlight the fact that, despite the adoption of the UN Charter nearly eight decades ago, international law has consistently failed to prevent the outbreak of wars. Nevertheless, international law continues to be the central framework for evaluating the legitimacy of state behavior. It remains the sole avenue for holding states accountable on the global stage. Therefore, even—indeed especially—when faced with its most egregious violations by regimes acting with impunity, it becomes imperative to invoke, defend, and apply international legal norms to uphold the rule-based global order.

 

Editorial 2: A fair share

Context

Keeping the States’ share at 41% would be unjust.

Introduction

The Sixteenth Finance Commission (SFC), effective from April 1, 2026, faces a complex task of redefining fiscal federalism in India. With 22 out of 28 States, including many BJP-ruled ones, demanding an increase in their share of the divisible tax pool from 41% to 50%, the issue has acquired both political and fiscal urgency. These demands arise amid the Centre’s growing reliance on non-shareable cesses and surcharges, which has effectively reduced States’ real share in national tax revenue.

Sixteenth Finance Commission (SFC)

• Effective Period: Recommendations of the 16th Finance Commissionwill apply from April 1, 2026.
• Chairperson: Arvind Panagariya, who recently flagged the fiscal concerns raised by States.
• Central Issue: Balancing vertical devolution(between Centre and States) and horizontal devolution (among States) amid rising fiscal centralisation.

Key Demand by States

• 22 out of 28 States, including many BJP-ruled States, have sought:
  • Increase in States’ shareof the divisible tax pool from 41% to 50%.
  • This is seen as a legitimate demandin view of eroded fiscal autonomy post-GST.

Shrinking of the Divisible Pool

Time Period	Share of Cesses & Surcharges in Centre’s Gross Tax Revenue
2015-16 to 2019-20 (Pre-COVID)	12.8%
2020-21 to 2023-24 (Post-COVID Budget Years)	18.5%

• Implication:
  • Increase in non-shareable cesses and surchargeshas reduced the effective share of States in central tax revenues.

Period	States’ Effective Share in Gross Tax Revenue
2015-16 to 2019-20	~35%
2020-21 to 2023-24	~31%

GST and States’ Fiscal Autonomy

• Post-GST Challenges:
  • States have limited avenues to raise their own revenue.
  • GST revenues, although buoyant, have not compensated for the loss of fiscal independence.
  • States are now heavily dependenton transfers from the Centre.

Horizontal Devolution: Formula Concerns

Criterion	Impact
Population	Favors high-population states (penalizes progressive ones)
Income Distance	Benefits poorer states; seen as penalizing efficiency

• Southern and progressive Statesargue that they are penalized for good governance and development.

Challenges Ahead for the Finance Commission

Risks of Status Quo:

• Maintaining the 41% vertical devolution:
  • Undermines cooperative federalism.
  • Misses the chanceto revise the federal compact.
• Centre’s Constraints:
  • Rising defence and capital expendituresmake the Centre hesitant to reduce its fiscal share.
  • Arvind Panagariya noted that a 9-point jumpin devolution would “upset too many carts.”

Way Forward

The Sixteenth Finance Commission should consider a modest increase in States’ share of the divisible pool, ideally to 44–45%, to address the fiscal imbalance while respecting the Centre’s spending needs. It must also recommend capping cesses and surcharges and including any surplus in the divisible pool to ensure transparency. Additionally, the horizontal devolution formula should be revised to better balance equity with performance, rewarding efficient governance while supporting less-developed States. This approach would strengthen cooperative federalism and create a fairer fiscal framework.

Conclusion

The Sixteenth Finance Commission must resist the temptation of maintaining fiscal status quo. Instead, it should seize this opportunity to forge a more equitable and cooperative fiscal federalism framework. By responsibly increasing vertical devolution, regulating non-transparent revenue tools, and reforming horizontal distribution, the Commission can strengthen the fiscal foundation of States — the true pillars of Indian democracy.