What to Read in Indian Express Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: Pak’s Iran balancing act

Context

Islamabad has extended strong rhetorical support to Tehran amid the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict.

The Pak-Iran relationship

• This delicate, deliberate balancing act is a product of Pakistan’s complicated relationship with Iranas well as larger geopolitical considerations, especially regarding its relationship with the US and anxieties about India.
• The relationship between the two Islamic republics can be best described as fraternal and strategic albeit with perennially simmering mutual suspicion and hostility.
• Iran was the first country to recognise Pakistan in 1947, and the Shah’s regime extended military and diplomatic assistance to Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars.
• But beyond the oft-emphasised veneer of Islamic brotherhood lie a number of friction points, which have surfaced frequently in the years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

A number of friction points

• The 900-km Iran-Pakistan borderruns through the Baloch heartland, with the Pak province of Balochistan on one side and the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan on the other.
• Each side accuses the other of providing safe haven to separatist groupswith at least 15 border clashes most recently in January 2024.
• Iran and Pakistan have long been at odds over Afghanistan,especially during the late 1990s when Shia-majority Iran supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, wary of a hardline Sunni regime on its 921-km border.
• In contrast, Pakistan backed the Taliban, aligning with its strategic interests.
• Pakistan’s close relationship with Saudi Arabia—its key patron—has deepened the divide, as Saudi-funded Sunni madrasas in Pakistan have fueled sectarian tensions and empowered groups that often target the country’s Shia minority, further complicating ties with Iran.

The American angle

• Iran’s post-Revolution rupture with the US and Pakistan’s continuing relianceon American support has further complicated the Islamabad-Tehran relationship.
• Pakistan is a rentier economy, reliant on foreign aid. During the Cold War, even as India chose to remain non-aligned, Pakistan under Gen Ayub Khan joined the Western bloc, positioning itself as a bulwark against communist expansionin South Asia.
• Pakistan’s long-standing reliance on the US, solidified after 9/11 when it supported American operations in Afghanistan, has waned since NATO’s 2021 withdrawal and Washington’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific.
• With tensions rising between Iran and Israel, Pakistan sees a chance to regain geostrategic relevance.
• While expressing rhetorical support for Iran, Islamabad’s swift refusal to offer military aid reassures the US and Israel.
• Pakistan now positions itself as a potential mediator, with its leaders highlighting efforts to encourage Iran-US dialogue, contingent on a halt to Israeli strikes.

View from New Delhi

• From India’s view, three key points stand out.
• First, Pakistan is using recent US involvement in India-Pak tensions during Op Sindoor to re-hyphenate itself with India and restore US ties—much to New Delhi’s discomfort.
• Second, India’s strategic investments in Iran, like the Chabahar port, bypass Pakistan and challenge the relevance of Gwadar.
• Pakistan sees any chance to weaken India-Iran ties, even through rhetorical support for Tehran,as a strategic move, though these ties remain strong.
• Third, Pakistan views Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as setting a dangerous precedent—one that India might follow against its own nuclear assets in a future conflict.

Way forward

• To ensure regional stability, India must prioritize diplomatic engagement and uphold its responsible nuclear posture.
• Continuing to honour nuclear agreements, especially the 1991 pact with Pakistan, and reinforcing ties with Iran will help counter Pakistan’s strategic moves while promoting long-term peace and balance in the region.

 

Editorial 2: Not by MSP

Context

Solution to import dependence on vegetable oil does not lie in hiking MSP.

Record Imports — Causes and Trends

• In 2024-25, India imported a record 7.3 million tonnes of pulses and 16.4 million tonnes of vegetable oils, worth $5.5 billion and $17.3 billion respectively.
• The spike in pulses imports can be attributed largely to the El Niño-induced droughtof 2023-24, which impacted domestic food production and drove up inflation well into late 2024.
• As a result, pulses imports jumped from an annual average of 2.6 million tonnes (2018-2023) to 4.7 million tonnes in 2023-24 and further to 7.3 million tonnes the following year.
• However, assuming normal monsoon conditions, pulses imports are likely to fall again in 2025-26.
• Vegetable oil imports, on the other hand, have grown consistently and now exhibit structural dependence.From 7.9 million tonnes in 2013-14, imports have more than doubled, reflecting both rising domestic demand and stagnation in oilseed productivity.
• Unlike pulses, where production has improved significantly over the years, oilseeds have seen little advancement in yield or area.

Success in Pulses, Lag in Oilseeds

• India’s relative success in pulses production stems from the development of improved crop varieties.
• Scientists have introduced short-duration chana (chickpea) and photo-thermo insensitive moong (green gram),allowing farmers to grow these with minimal irrigation and across multiple seasons.
• This innovation helped raise pulses production post-2015-16, making India nearly self-sufficient in normal years, with limited importsmainly of arhar (pigeon pea) and urad (black gram).
• In contrast, oilseed productivity remains low. India’s soyabean yields are just around 1 tonne per hectare, while global leaders like Argentina and Brazil achieve 2.6 to 3.5 tonnes.
• The prohibition on genetically modified (GM) crops like soyabean and mustardhas restricted yield improvements. Consequently, India’s vegetable oil import dependence remains above 60% and continues to rise.
• Policy support has also been weaker in oilseeds. While the government announces Minimum Support Prices (MSPs), these are often ineffective without actual procurement.

Suggestions

• Reducing India’s import dependence requires a long-term strategy focused on improving productivity and reducing cultivation costs.
• In oilseeds, this means investing in R&D, allowing GM technology where proven safe, and promoting better agronomic practices.
• Instead of relying on unsustainable MSP hikes, the government should offer targeted income support to pulses and oilseed farmers, giving them assured returns while maintaining market efficiency.

Conclusion

India’s progress in pulses shows what is possible with coordinated policy, research, and extension. Replicating this model in oilseeds is essential to address the growing vegetable oil import bill and strengthen national food security.