What to Read in The Hindu Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: Iran’s n-programme, the illusion of a surgical strike

Context

Iran’s nuclear programme is large and tough, not stopped by a few air strikes; only long-term diplomacy can work.

Introduction

In rising tensions in West Asia, Israel and now the United States attacked Iran’s nuclear sites and top scientists. Iran fought back with drones and missiles, some getting past the Iron Dome defence. As the conflict grows, an important question arises: Can Iran’s nuclear program be stopped by military force? The simple answer is no, or at least not easily. Despite years of effort, using the military against Iran’s nuclear plans is very complicated, limited, and risky.

Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure and Military Strike Challenges

• Nuclear facilities designed for attack resistance:Uranium enrichment sites like Fordow and Natanz are deep underground.
  • Fordow is buried 80 to 100 metersunder a mountain near Qom.
  • Sites are protected by reinforced concrete and steel(RCC).
  • Facilities are hardened with the specific goalto resist air strikes.
• Limitations of conventional weapons:Standard bombs or missiles cannot destroy these underground bunkers.
  • Only bunker-busting bombswith extreme penetration can damage such facilities.
• S. bunker-busting capabilities:The GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) is a 30,000-pound bomb.
  • Can penetrate up to 60 meters of earthor 18 meters of reinforced concrete.
  • Requires precise, repeated hits over daysfor effectiveness.
  • Must be delivered by B-2 Spiritor B-52 Stratofortress bombers (U.S.-only aircraft).
• Israel’s current strike capabilities:Does not have the GBU-57 or bombers to carry it.
  • Uses GBU-28 bombscapable of penetrating 5-6 meters of concrete (~30m earth).
  • Upgraded F-35I stealth fightersfor bunker-busting, but limited against deep targets.
  • Can damage but not fully destroyhighly fortified sites like Fordow without U.S. help.
• Rebuilding potential:Even if key sites like Natanz and Fordow are damaged, Iran can rebuild quickly.
  • Example: After the 2010 Stuxnet cyberattack, Iran repaired and expanded Natanz.
• Comparison with past Israeli strikes:Successful strikes on Iraq’s Osirak (1981) and Syria’s Al-Kibar (2007).
  • Those targets were above ground, isolated, and early-stage.
  • Iran’s nuclear program is mature, spread out, duplicated, and heavily fortified.
  • Israeli strikes likely failed to destroyIran’s near-bomb-grade nuclear fuel stores.
• Overall assessment:Israel’s unilateral strike would likely only delay Iran’s program temporarily, not dismantle it.

Comparison of Key Nuclear Sites and Strike Capabilities

Feature	Fordow Facility	Natanz Facility	Israeli Strike Capability	U.S. Strike Capability
Location	80-100 meters underground, mountain near Qom	Underground, less deep than Fordow	Can damage but not fully destroy	Can target deep underground with MOP
Protection	Reinforced concrete & rock (RCC)	Reinforced concrete	GBU-28 bomb (penetrates ~5-6m RCC)	GBU-57 MOP (penetrates 18m RCC)
Delivery Aircraft	N/A	N/A	F-35I stealth fighters (limited)	B-2 Spirit / B-52 bombers
Ability to destroy site	Very difficult without U.S. help	Difficult but more vulnerable	Partial damage only	Possible with repeated hits
Rebuilding potential	High	High	Cannot prevent rebuilding	N/A

Why Israel Seeks U.S. Support Against Iran

• Israeli leadershave often depended on S. backing for major military actions against Iran.
• Former U.S. President Donald Trumpsuggested Israel might get access to advanced U.S. weapons like MOP-class bunker busters.
• In 2020, talks about selling such bombs to Israel resurfaced, but no official transferhas happened yet.
• Even with U.S. help, the logistical and political costsfor both countries would be very high.

Challenges of a Military Operation Against Iran

• Operation would need regional airspace access, risking sovereignty violationsof countries like Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
• This could trigger a wider regional war.
• Iran could retaliate through proxiessuch as:
  • Hezbollahin Lebanon
  • Militias in Iraqand Syria
  • Houthi rebelsin Yemen
• Direct attacks on Israeli and American assetsin the Gulf are also possible.

Iran’s Warning and Retaliation Capability

• Iran has warned of a “crushing” responseto any attack on its nuclear sites.
• Its ballistic missileand regional alliance network make this threat credible.
• In April 2024, Iran launched over 300 drones and missilesin response to an Israeli strike in Damascus.
• Although most were intercepted, the attack showed Iran’s ability to challenge Israeli air defences.
• The clear message: Iran will respond stronglyto any Israeli strike.

Why Diplomacy Is the Only Real Solution for Iran’s Nuclear Issue

• A full-scale regional warwould:
  • Disrupt global oil supplies.
  • Destabilise fragile states.
  • Drag the S. and alliesinto a long, uncertain conflict.
  • Likely fail to meet its main goals.
• Diplomacy, though imperfect, remains the only viable long-term option.
• The 2015 JCPOA deal:
  • Limited Iran’s nuclear program.
  • Allowed international inspections.
• Since the S. left in 2018, Iran has:
  • Increased its uranium stockpileto 30 times the allowed limit.
  • Raised enrichment levelsto 60%.
  • Reduced cooperation with the IAEA.
• A new nuclear dealwill be harder due to:
  • Regional instability.
  • Deep mistrust.
• Still, it is more achievable than a costly war with no guaranteed success.
• The ongoing cycle of attacks and retaliationrisks:
  • Greater regional instability.
  • Higher human and economic costs.
• Iran’s nuclear program is a large, hardened, and redundant system, not a single target.
• For Israel and the U.S., a “clean” surgical strikeis a dangerous illusion.
• The way forward requires:
  • Diplomatic strategy.
  • Multilateral pressure.
  • Careful verification.
  • Strong deterrence.

Conclusion

Iran’s nuclear program is not only technically advanced but also built strong to survive military attacks. The key lesson from the last 20 years of Middle East policy is this: wars are easy to begin but very hard to finish. If the current attacks grow into a full war, the damage from failure would be disastrous.

 

Editorial 2: The sorry state of South Asian economic integration

Context

Lack of trust and regional conflicts are stopping important trade agreements from being fully carried out.

Introduction

So far this year, two major events have shaken India’s economic and national security: the reciprocal tariffs by the Trump administration and the terror attack in Pahalgam. Though these events seem unrelated, their root causes and effects are closely connected. This shows the urgent need for a comprehensive regional strategy for both security and economic stability. Economic and national security are often treated separately, but they are strongly linked. Border disputes among South Asian countries greatly block trade and economic cooperation, stopping the region from reaching its full potential. Economic instability causes unrest, while security threats disrupt trade and investment. No country can have lasting security without economic growth, and the reverse is also true.

Economic Integration in South Asia: Key Facts and Comparisons

• South Asia is among the least economically integrated regions globally.
• Intraregional trade within South Asia (SAFTA)accounts for only 5% to 7% of total international trade.
• This percentage is lowest compared to other major trading blocs:
  • European Union (EU): ~45%
  • ASEAN: ~22%
  • NAFTA: ~25%
• Current trade among SAARC countries is around $23 billion, much lower than the estimated potential of $67 billion.
• A UNESCAP study estimated that South Asia’s potential trade could have reached $172 billion by 2020, indicating that over 86% of trade capacity remains untapped.
• South Asia, with 25% of the world’s population, has a combined GDP of $5 trillion—much smaller compared to:
  • EU: $18 trillion (5.8% of world population)
  • NAFTA: $24.8 trillion

Intraregional Trade and GDP of Major Economic Blocs

Region	Intraregional Trade (% of Total Trade)	Population (% of World)	GDP (in trillion USD)
South Asia (SAFTA)	5% – 7%	25%	5
European Union (EU)	~45%	5.8%	18
ASEAN	~22%	—	—
NAFTA	~25%	—	24.8

South Asia Intraregional Trade: Challenges and Key Data

• Intraregional trade in South Asia remains less than a third of its potential, despite trade liberalization under SAFTA (according to the UNESCAP South Asia Gravity Model).
• Countries with highest unexploited trade potential:
  • Bangladesh:93% unexploited
  • Maldives:88%
  • Pakistan:86%
  • Afghanistan:83%
  • Nepal:76%
• India-Pakistan trade has sharply declineddue to terror insurgencies and border disputes:
  • Bilateral trade fell from $2.41 billion (2018)to $1.2 billion (2024).
  • Pakistani exports to India dropped from $547.5 million (2019)to just $480,000 (2024).
• South Asia’s trade-to-GDP ratiodropped from 30% (2022) to 42.94% (2024).
• The World Bank growth forecastfor the region was reduced to 8% (2025) from 6% (2024).
• Imports have grown faster than exports, widening the trade deficitfrom $204.1 billion (2015) to $339 billion (2022).
• However, the total trade value(exports + imports) rose significantly from 2015 to 2022, reaching approximately $1,335 billion.

High Costs and Political Barriers

• Despite SAFTA, trading with neighbors is not truly freedue to:
  • Inefficient trade mechanisms
  • Unstable political relations
  • High costs of intraregional trade (114% of the goods’ value)
• For comparison:
  • Trade cost between South Asia and the S.is 109%, despite the longer distance.
  • Trading with Pakistan is 20% more expensivefor India than trading with Brazil, which is 22 times farther.
  • High costs discourage regional value chainsdespite geographic closeness.
• ASEAN’s intraregional trade costsare 40% lower than SAARC’s, at 76%, encouraging greater economic interdependence.

The main hurdles

Issue	Details	Impact	Suggested Action
Low Intraregional Trade	South Asia’s intraregional trade remains very low despite SAFTA and other agreements.	Shows absence of strategic trade policies.	Implement stronger regional economic policies.
Untapped Potential	Over two-thirds of potential trade in goods, services, and investment remains unexploited.	Limits economic growth and development opportunities.	Focus on lowering trade barriers and encouraging investment.
Political and Security Challenges	Trust deficits, regional conflicts, terrorism, and political diversity hinder cooperation.	Prevents full implementation of agreements like SAFTA.	Resolve disputes, build trust, and promote peace.
Conflict Among SAARC Members	Most SAARC countries have bilateral conflicts and tensions.	Blocks effective regional integration and cooperation.	Set aside bilateral conflicts for regional growth.
Economic Consequences	Less trade leads to reduced innovation, production, and investment capacity.	Slows down economic development and prosperity.	Enhance intra-regional trade for shared benefits.

Conclusion

South Asia’s economic integration remains weak due to deep-rooted political conflicts, trust deficits, and high trade costs, despite significant untapped potential. The region’s low intraregional trade limits growth and stability, underscoring the urgent need for political reconciliation and stronger regional cooperation. Only by overcoming these barriers can South Asia fully harness its economic and security potential for lasting prosperity.