What to Read in The Hindu Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: ​​Introspecting counter-terrorism after Operation Sindoor

Context

While focusing on India’s foreign policy and military strength, what’s often missed is the internalisation of terrorismin Jammu and Kashmir.

Introduction

The Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 by Pakistan-backed groups, and India’s response through Operation Sindoor on May 7, have reshaped regional security. Though the operation was a tactical success, its long-term impact on terrorism is unclear. Current debates mostly focus on foreign policy and external military force, ignoring the internal growth of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The real goal should be securing Kashmir, not just defeating Pakistan.

The complex reality of terrorism in J&K

1. Pakistan’s Responsibility & Internal Dynamics

• Pakistan has long been responsiblefor the unstable security situation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
• After 1989, terrorism shifted from being local-led to foreign-supported(especially by mid-1990s).
• Despite foreign involvement, local issueslike identity, marginalisation, repression, and political exclusion have played key roles.
• These local issues enable Pakistanto exploit the situation.
• There’s a complex webof external support and internal weaknesses—making simple military solutions ineffective.

2. Achievements of Security Forces

• Since 1989, security forces have made major gains.
• Fatalities have droppedsignificantly—from over 4,000 in 2001 to 127 in 2024 (SATP data).
• This is due to:
  • Better security grid
  • Government outreach to locals
  • Pakistan’s weakened proxy war capacity

3. Effectiveness of Deterrence

• Kinetic actions(e.g., 2016 surgical strikes, 2019 Balakot strike) did not deter Pakistan.
• Fatalities increased after these strikes, showing limited strategic deterrence.
• Even Operation Sindoor, though more advanced, may not prevent future escalation.

4. Current Status of Local Terrorism

• Fewer local terroristsnow compared to the Burhan Wani era.
• But their role still matters—foreign terrorists rely on themfor local support and logistics.
• After the Pahalgam attack, many local-terrorist links to foreign groupshave been identified.

5. Security Gaps & Local Support

• Troop movement to Galwancreated security gaps in Jammu region.
• New terror groupslike The Resistance Front, People’s Anti-Fascist Front, and Kashmir Tigers exploited these gaps.
• Kill ratios now favour terroristsin some areas.
• Local support for terrorismand lack of human intelligence (HUMINT) remain serious concerns.

Strategic Insights on Public Sentiment and Counterterrorism in J&K

Parameter	Important reasons
Public Reaction	Bipartisan and spontaneous support from locals after Pahalgam massacre was unprecedented.
Strategic Opportunity	This support offers a rare window to build trust and stability, not to be wasted.
Counterproductive Measures	Actions like house demolitions and mass arrests risk alienating the population.
Externalisation of Terrorism	Military responses (e.g., Operation Sindoor) are important but can shift focus away from local issues.
Expert Concerns	Post-Operation Sindoor analysis shows a trend of oversimplifying terrorism, focusing only on externals.
Root Causes	Real challenge lies in addressing both Pakistan’s sponsorship and internal grievances in J&K.

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor showcases India’s rising strength in kinetic non-contact warfare, but it must be paired with non-kinetic strategies for a stronger deterrent against Pakistan. The key is to focus on a multidimensional approach centered on the people as the core. Combining sustained political engagement, economic growth, social integration, and security measures forms a complete strategy. True deterrence requires this comprehensive approach supported by national resolve.

 

Editorial 2: ​Decisive moment

Context

Basavaraju’s killing could weaken the Maoists and create an opportunity for peace.

Introduction

The killing of Namballa Keshav Rao, aka Basavaraju, general secretary of the outlawed CPI (Maoist), marks a significant setback for the insurgency in Chhattisgarh. His leadership symbolized a renewed militaristic approach to Maoist operations, but his death highlights the weakening of the group’s armed campaign amid intensified security efforts and declining tribal support.

Major Blow to CPI (Maoist)

• Killing of General Secretary
  • Namballa Keshav Rao, alias Basavaraju, the general secretary of the outlawed Communist Party of India (Maoist), was killed in security operations in Chhattisgarh on Wednesday.
  • This is considered the biggest setback for the Maoists since the 2010 death of Cherukuri Rajkumar, then spokesperson of CPI (Maoist), in a security operation.
• Role and Influence of Basavaraju
  • Previously headed the party’s central military commission before becoming general secretary in 2018.
  • Orchestrated numerous attacks against paramilitary and police forces.
  • His leadership marked a firm commitment to a militaristic approach, emphasizing a “protracted peoples’ war” over political dialogue or agitation.

Implications of Basavaraju’s Death

• Strategic Failure for Maoists
  • The death of Basavaraju, along withseveral other Maoist cadres in recent years, signals the failure of their militarist strategy.
  • Home Minister Amit Shahhas stated the government’s goal to eliminate the Maoist threat by 2026, viewing this event as a major victory.
• Questions on Peace vs. Armed Struggle
  • Despite continued armed conflict, Maoists reportedly sought peace talks, raising the question of whether leaders could have been captured instead of killed.
  • Recent surrenders of Maoist cadres reinforce this point.
  • However, senior Maoist leaders,with roots in the original Naxalite movement, remain committed to armed struggle, making violent encounters likely.

Decline in Maoist Support and Recruitment

• Reduced Recruitment and Tribal Support
  • Maoists admit to a sharp decline in new recruits, particularly among tribal youth in south Chhattisgarh.
  • Many tribal youths, having suffered in the decades-long conflict, are rejecting the Maoist radical agenda.
• Changing Ground Realities
  • Maoists’ rejection of the electoral process as a “mere facade” isincreasingly unpopular in previously inaccessible forest areas.
  • Governmentinitiatives on tribal welfare and outreach programs have weakened Maoist influence.
  • Enhanced security efforts have eroded both Maoist military capabilities and their local support base.

Way Forward: Peace and Security

• Current Status of the Maoist Movement
  • The Maoist movement is struggling for survivalfollowing the loss of senior leaders and intensified security operations.
  • However, these operations have also resulted in casualtiesamong tribal youth, exacerbating local grievances.
• Call for Peace Talks
  • The government is urged to leverage the current situationto push for renewed peace negotiations.
  • Encouraging Maoists to abandonarmed struggle could prevent further alienation of tribal communities.
  • Continued reliance on “annihilation” policiesrisks generating new resentment and prolonging conflict.

Conclusion

Basavaraju’s death underscores the diminishing strength of the Maoist insurgency, yet ongoing violence continues to impact tribal communities. To break the cycle, the government should prioritize peace talks and political engagementover solely militaristic approaches. Encouraging dialogue could help resolve longstanding conflicts and address tribal grievances, fostering lasting peace and stability in affected regions.