What to Read in Indian Express Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial-1: The Indian Express

US should negotiate a successor to JCPOA with Iran. Now is the time

Context

The American strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan have brought to the fore three major issues: The success of the strikes, the future of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU), and the nature of US-Israel-Iran dealings going forward.

Introduction

The extent of damage to Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility remains unclear. Twelve GBU-57 bombs, capable of penetrating up to 60 metres, targeted ventilation shafts above the centrifuge hall located 80 metres underground—likely falling short of direct impact.  Key concerns include whether concussive shockwaves damaged the underground systems, caused ventilation collapse, harmed personnel, or disrupted power to centrifuges. Iran’s admission of severe damage raises questions over its credibility and strategic intent.

Damage to Fordow and Concerns Over HEU Stockpiles

• If Fordow has effectively been sealed and control over the centrifuges is lost, a direct hit on the centrifuge hall may not matter. The centrifuges will, over time, simply become inoperable. In this sense, the US President may be at least partly right: Fordow may have been obliterated functionally.
• Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), reportedly enriched up to 60% and potentially usable for bomb-making, was stored at Fordow, with around 160 kg at the site and possibly 400 kg in total.
• These stockpiles were likely moved before the strikes, although this is contested by the Trump administration. If relocated, the HEU would have been dispersed across multiple sites to enhance survivability.
• However, considering the intelligence capabilities of the US and Israel, it is likely that the location of the HEU will eventually be discovered. Given past operations against Iranian nuclear scientists and generals, Israel is expected to trace the HEU as well.

Strategic Options and Need for International Oversight

• Once the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is located,the United States and Israel would face strategic choices. Inaction is unlikely, as Iran is believed to be capable of further enriching the HEU at a covert facility within months.
• Military strikes on the HEU carry significant risks, as they could lead to “dirty bomb” effects by dispersing radioactive material without a nuclear explosion. This may provoke global condemnation and could set a precedent endangering Israel’s own nuclear infrastructure.
• A more viable option would be to bring the HEU under international safeguards. This would require Iran to disclose the stockpile locations, enabling access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)and the reimplementation of continuous monitoring as provided under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran’s nuclear deal) ·         The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was an agreement between Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the European Union. ·         Its objective was to address the nuclear issue by easing sanctions on Iran in return for strict limits on its nuclear programme. These included reducing the number of centrifuges, capping uranium enrichment at 3.67%, and restricting the low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile to 300 kg. ·          Iran adhered to the agreement until the United States, under President Donald Trump, withdrew from it in 2018 and reinstated sanctions.

Prospects for a New Nuclear Agreement

• For a new deal to be struck on Iran’s nuclear activities, the United States will need to negotiate a successor to the JCPOA. In his comments on the strikes on Iran, US President Donald Trump drew a parallel to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks during World War II, seeming to suggest that Iran is similarly prostrate. In fact, the parallel is far from accurate. Iran is not an occupied country.
• Both sides face limits. The US wants to avoid another “forever war”, not least due to domestic opposition. In addition, its supplies of defensive missiles and other war materials are under stress from provisioning Ukraine and Israel.
• Israel’s famous air defences are strained, perhaps to breaking point, and it will be increasingly vulnerable to retaliatory missile attacks. Iran’s options, too, are limited. Tehran must worry that both Israel and the US will resume attacks, and not just on nuclear facilities, and that internal dissent will boil over.

Conclusion

The conditions are ripe, therefore, for a new nuclear deal. That said, the ceasefire must hold, and Iran must have an authority figure that can deliver a deal. Neither is certain. In addition, the US may have to sweeten the deal economically by lifting sanctions. This will depend on Trump overcoming domestic and Israeli opposition. In short, there is a road ahead, but it is a rocky one.

 

Editorial 2: India and the new world order

Context

It is time India reconfigured its global engagements, going beyond old-world romanticism and Cold War calculations.

Introduction

• Eurasia is in turmoil. Three major conflicts — Russia-Ukraine, Israel’s Gaza operations and the Israel-Iran-US conflict — are reshaping the geopolitics of the region. Wars don’t just cause physical destruction; they profoundly impact international relations.
• Beyond Eurasia, US President Donald Trump is causing serious drift and disorderin the Western world. The US and Western Europe, powerhouses of the last century, appear to be decisively moving into a slow afternoon. At the same time, the world is witnessing the unmissable rise of China as a dominant economic and technological superpower. These developments, coupled with a few other important ones, will lead to the emergence of a new global order.

Major challenge for India

• India developed institutions and initiatives based on the premises of the old world. But the emerging order calls for a new way of thinking about its geostrategic priorities.
• During the ill-fated Cultural Revolution years in China, Chairman Mao Zedong used to call for the abolition of the “Four Olds”— old ideology, old culture, old habits and old customs. This might be a wrong analogy, but India, too, needs to come out of the mindset of the last century.

India and India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

• India has developed strong ties with Europe over the past few decades and, in recent years, has significantly deepened engagement with Middle Eastern powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• These efforts led to the launch of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a promising initiative connecting South Asia with the GCC region and Europe.
• Signed in September 2023 during the G20 summitin New Delhi, IMEC gained attention among strategic experts and think tanks.
• However, with the evolving geopolitical situation in Eurasia, India must recalibrate IMEC carefully.Despite its potential, the project faces major challenges, particularly due to regional instability.
• Moreover, IMEC’s positioning has been flawed, often portrayed as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Confusing geo-economics with geo-strategyreflects outdated thinking. Most GCC countries are BRI partners, and 17 of 27 EU members maintain strong trade ties with China. Only Italy has exited the BRI, while others continue to benefit from Chinese investments.

Challenges and Realities of the IMEC Vision

• There is a tendency among some scholars to romanticise IMEC by invoking ancient trade routes between India and Europe via Gulf ports.
• While India indeed traded spices and textiles for Roman gold in ancient times— prompting complaints from Roman scholars about a gold drain — today’s geopolitical and economic realities are very different. For instance, Oman, once central to ancient trade routes, is not even part of IMEC.
• Logistical complexitiesalso challenge IMEC’s viability. Under the current scheme, goods from India would travel by sea to Middle Eastern ports like Jebel Ali (Dubai), move overland to Haifa (Israel), and then be shipped again to European ports such as Marseille (France) and Trieste (Italy).
• While some suggest this route could bypass the Suez Canal to save time and cost, this is debatable. On average, 75 large ships— each carrying over 100,000 tonnes — pass through the Suez daily.
• To replace even one such ship, at least 18.5 freight trains(each carrying about 5,500 tonnes) would be required. The infrastructure required for this would be massive, and key land-route countries like Jordan and Egypt are not yet IMEC members.
• Despite these hurdles, the potential of accessing the $18 trillion EU economy is significant. However, India’s prospects must be tempered by the EU’s sluggish growth (around 1%) and China’s dominant position in the EU market, with over 55% share in manufactured goods and increasing presence in other sectors.

Need for Strategic Reconfiguration in India’s Foreign Engagements

• India has a history of announcing ambitious connectivity projects that later stagnate. For instance, the North-South Corridor project, initiated by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government and signed with Russia and Iran in 2003, remains largely unrealised. In contrast, China capitalised on the delay, establishing strong ties with both countries.
• Similarly, India’s Look East policy of the 1990s,rebranded as Act East under Prime Minister Modi, has delivered limited results. Despite ASEAN becoming a free trade partner in 2010 and a comprehensive strategic partner in 2022, India’s trade with ASEAN stands at $120 billion — far behind China’s rising $1 trillion trade volume with the bloc.

Conclusion

Beyond IMEC, India must deepen its engagement with Eastern and Central Europe, Russia, and ASEAN. This requires moving beyond outdated romanticism and Cold War-era thinking to adopt a multidirectional, goal-oriented foreign policy that reflects today’s geopolitical realities.