What to Read in The Hindu Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: ​​​​A start for North-South carbon market cooperation

Context

Linking the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) with the Indian carbon market is significant, but key hurdles still remain.

Introduction

On September 17, 2025, the European Union (EU) and India unveiled a New Strategic EU-India Agenda outlining a comprehensive roadmap for cooperation. The agenda focuses on five pillars — prosperity and sustainability, technology and innovation, security and defence, connectivity and global issues, and cross-pillar enablers. Hidden within the section on clean transition is a noteworthy commitment: the EU’s plan to link the Indian Carbon Market (ICM) with its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

• In simple terms, the carbon price paid in Indiawill be deducted from the CBAM charges at the EU border.
• This marks a major breakthrough, potentially protecting Indian exportersfrom double taxation.
• It could also incentivise early decarbonisationby rewarding cleaner production.
• However, significant challengesstill hamper implementation.
• Unless these barriers are resolved, the integration may stallbefore yielding tangible benefits.

Challenges in Aligning India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS/ICM) with the EU’s CBAM

Structural and Institutional Gaps

• India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS/ICM)is still an evolving framework, unlike the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), which has over two decades of tested mechanisms.
• The EU ETSfeatures a robust auction system, cap-setting processes, and independent verification — all missing or weak in the Indian setup.
• Indian creditscurrently stem from intensity-based improvements or project offsets, not absolute emission caps, which CBAM mandates for tonne-for-tonne accounting.
• Without legally binding capsand strict penalties, EU regulators are likely to treat Indian credits as inferior.
• India lacks institutional equivalentsto the EU’s regulators or emission registries, which ensure market transparency and environmental integrity.
• Therefore, the EU cannot deduct Indian carbon pricesunless the ICM demonstrates credible verification and compliance mechanisms.
• Bridging this gap is not just technical — it demands a complete structural redesignof the ICM to match EU compliance standards, which remains a bureaucratic challenge in India.

Carbon Price Disparity and Political Risks

Parameter	EU ETS	Indian CCTS/ICM	Implication
Carbon Price Range	€60 – €80 per tonne	€5 – €10 per tonne	Huge price gap reduces deduction eligibility under CBAM.
Emission Basis	Absolute cap-based	Intensity/project-based	Fails CBAM’s tonne-for-tonne requirement.
Verification System	Independent, regulated	Fragmented, evolving	Low trust in credit integrity.
Institutional Oversight	Strong, rule-based	Weak, fragmented	EU sees systemic risk in integration.

Domestic and Policy Implications

• Without comparable carbon prices, the EU may refuse full deductions, leading to dual costsfor Indian exporters.
• This could create domestic political backlash, as industries may resist “double burden” compliance.
• Firms could lobby to diluteIndia’s ICM rules, weakening its environmental credibility.
• Bridging the price and structural gapwill need:
  • Sector-specific carbon contracts, or
  • A negotiated floor pricealigned with CBAM expectations — both politically difficult to implement in the near term.

Political and Strategic Contradictions in Linking CBAM with India’s Carbon Market

1. WTO and Political Tensions

• Even if technical and pricing issuesare addressed, CBAM remains politically contentious.
• India and other developing countrieshave opposed CBAM at the WTO and global forums, branding it a unilateral and protectionist measure.
• Hence, agreeing to link the Indian Carbon Market (ICM)with CBAM creates a political contradiction — India would be endorsing a mechanism it has formally opposed.

2. Future Disputes and Sovereignty Risks

• Disputes may arise if the EU deems India’s carbon price “insufficient”and refuses full deductions.
• Such a scenario would prompt exporters’ protestsand force New Delhi to escalate the issue politically or legally.
• This raises a sovereignty concern, as carbon pricingis a domestic policy tool, yet CBAM effectively gives Brussels a say in India’s climate measures.
• For a country that fiercely protects policy autonomy, this could become a red linein future negotiations.

3. Strategic and Domestic Vulnerabilities

Issue	Risk/Implication
Dependence on stable carbon market	CBAM deductions depend on India maintaining a transparent and consistent carbon market.
Domestic backtracking	Any rollback of compliance due to industry pressure would expose exporters to full CBAM levies.
Trade instability	Such shifts could disrupt trade flows and undermine exporter confidence.
Policy contradiction	India would be simultaneously cooperating and contesting the same mechanism on different platforms.

4. Broader Implication

• The ICM–CBAM linkageis not merely a technical alignment but a test of political trust and strategic coherence.
• It is hostage to WTO legalities, domestic political economy, and the fragile balance of EU-India climate diplomacy.

Looking at optimistic resolutions

• The linkage between India’s Carbon Market (ICM)and the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is among the most significant outcomes of their new strategic agenda.
• If implemented successfully, it can protect Indian exportersfrom double taxation, accelerate industrial decarbonisation, and set a precedent for North–South carbon market cooperation.
• However, weak institutional structures, mismatched carbon prices, and political contradictionsthreaten to undermine its success.
• A stronger collaborative frameworkis needed — India must strengthen market design and enforcement, while the EU should offer technical clarity and transitional support.
• Without such alignment, this “breakthrough” will remain symbolic, and Indian exporterswill continue to bear CBAM costs at the border.

Conclusion

The proposed ICM–CBAM linkage represents a bold step toward North–South climate cooperation, offering a path to fairer trade and faster decarbonisation. Yet, its success hinges on institutional reform, price parity, and political trust. Only through mutual transparency, policy alignment, and sustained dialogue can this partnership move beyond symbolism and deliver real climate and trade benefits for both sides.

 

Editorial 2: ​​Devil in the details

Context

ECI’s Roll Revision Drive Must Avoid Bihar’s Flaws

Introduction

The Election Commission of India (ECI) has launched a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls across 12 States and Union Territories to correct errors caused by migration, deceased voters, and inaccuracies. However, experiences from Bihar show that despite good intent, the process risks large-scale disenfranchisement—especially of women and youth—due to procedural haste, digital gaps, and verification flaws.

Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Electoral Rolls

Context and Objective

• After Bihar, the Election Commission of India (ECI)has launched a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) in 12 States and Union Territories.
• Goal:To update rolls affected by
  • Frequent migration
  • Deaths of voters
  • Inaccuracies flagged by political parties, especially the Congress.

Lessons from Bihar

• Duration:Conducted on a short timeline — about a month for enumeration and a month for claims & objections.
• New Change:Introduction of a 54-day notice period for hearing and verification.
• Outcome:The hurried process led to statistical distortions in voter data.

Issue	Observation in Bihar	Implication
Gender ratio	Fell from 907 → 892 women per 1,000 men	Indicates disproportionate exclusion of women voters
Age group affected	18–29 years	Marked deletions under “permanently shifted” category
Pattern noted	High female turnout areas showed higher female deletions	Reflects procedural bias contrary to stated objectives

Procedural Weaknesses

• Burden of verificationlies heavily on:
  • Citizens themselves, and
  • Booth Level Agents (BLAs)of political parties.
• This reliance is problematic as:
  • Party representatives may act from partisan interests.
  • Booth Level Officers (BLOs)have limited capacity for extensive verification.

ECI’s Response and Shortcomings

• ECI’s stance:Those left out can re-register with help from BLAs — an inadequate remedy.
• Supreme Court intervention:
  • Directed ECI to publish lists of excluded voterswith reasons.
  • Led to partial correction, but structural flaws remain.
• New model:Being expanded nationwide, despite concerns from Bihar’s experience.

Continuing Risks

Area	Concern	Explanation
Temporary migrants	May be absent during verification	Risk losing voting rights despite being “ordinarily resident”
Digital solutions	Online Enumeration Form	Fails to address digital divide and literacy barriers
Field verification	BLOs’ three-visit rule	Still inadequate for large urban or migrant populations

Way Forward

• Civil society, media, and political partiesmust exercise intense vigilance.
• Goal:Prevent errors that could undermine the integrity of India’s electoral democracy.

Conclusion

While the SIR initiative reflects the ECI’s drive for cleaner voter rolls, its implementation must avoid excluding genuine electors. Over-reliance on digital tools, limited field verification, and citizen burden threaten inclusiveness. Strengthening transparency, ensuring due process, and enabling civil society vigilance are essential to safeguard the integrity of India’s electoral democracy and the principle of universal adult suffrage.