What to Read in Indian Express Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1 : Drone warfare & India

Context

Drone warfare came home during Op Sindoor.

Drones, a brief history

• Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) date back to World War II and the Korean War, where they were used for training anti-aircraft gunners and in specific offensive missions.
• Their modern military usage took off in the 1990s, after being successfully deployed in the Gulf War of 1991.
• The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 2020 marked a turning point in drone warfare: Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Israeli Harop dronesdevastated Armenian defences, decisively shifting the conflict’s dynamics in favour of Baku.
• Since then, drones have played a key role in: Yemen,where Houthi rebels targeted Saudi oil infrastructure using drone swarms; Gaza, where Israel has deployed high-tech drones for surveillance and strikes, and Hamas has used drones for grenades and observation; and Ukraine, where both Moscow and Kyiv have deployed commercial quadcopters (DJI drones), military drones (Bayraktar TB2, Orlan-10, Shahed-136), and loitering munitions.
• Ukraine has notably used “first-person view” (FPV) racing drones to target tanks, chase individual soldiers and small units.
• Recently, Ukraine carried out Operation Spider’s Web, one of the most sophisticated drone operations in history, using 100–150 FPV drones, transported clandestinely in trucks deep into Russia.
• Meanwhile, Russia throughout the war has used Iranian-made Shahed kamikaze dronesin swarms to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, and target critical infrastructure such as energy grids.

Not one, not two…

• Swarm drones are autonomous or semi-autonomous UAVsthat operate in coordinated groups, much like swarms of birds or fish.
• They communicate via wireless networks and adjust in real time to achieve shared objectives.
• Swarms are more resilient than traditional drones due to in-built redundancy— even if one drone is intercepted, others can continue on the mission.
• Drone swarms are thus used to saturate air defencesgathering intelligence, and attacking high-value targets.
• According to Fortune Business Insights, the global military drone market stood at $14.14 billion in 2023, and is projected to hit $47.16 billion by 2032.

Countering drone threats

• Defence against drones begins with detection. Modern systems employ a mix of AESA radars, electro-optical and infrared sensors, acoustic detectors, and AI-powered fusion systems.
• Once detected, one option is for drones to be neutralised through kinetic means, that is, with missiles and anti-aircraft guns.
• But traditional kinetic air defences, especially surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), are costly, and less effective against swarms.
• Automated gun systems such as C-RAM and Phalanx,which track targets and fire autonomously, are preferred in this role.
• Even more cost-effective alternatives include: Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs): Lasers and microwave pulses that disable drones by damaging sensors or frying electronics;
• Electronic Warfare (EW): Jamming GPS signals or communication links;
• Spoofing: Misleading drones about their location or issuing false commands;
• Cyber Attacks: Taking control of drones and crash them by exploiting software vulnerabilities; and
• Interceptor drones & nets: For close-range neutralisation, protecting critical assets.
• The asymmetry in cost remains the central challenge in anti-drone warfare. A drone swarm costing roughly $100,000 might take millions of dollars to neutralise with currently available technology.
• This is why nations, including India, are investing in more cost-effective solutions like EW and DEWs.
• The ideal defence is a layered system, integrating multiple modes of interception for redundancy and cost-efficiency purposes. Examples include Israel’s Iron Dome and the US’s Directed Energy M-SHORAD.

India’s capabilities

• Since 2020, India has ramped up its counter-drone infrastructure, deploying a layered defence that blends indigenous technology, EW, and air defence systems.
• Key systems include: Akashteer Air Defence Control System: Developed by Bharat Electronics Ltd, it integrates with the Indian Air Force’s integrated command network for real-time tracking;
• Bhargavastra: Solar Defence and Aerospace Ltd’s weapon system fires 64 micro-rockets in salvos to eliminate drone swarms;
• DRDO’s Anti-Drone System: It offers 360-degree radar coverage, with both jamming (soft kill) and laser (hard kill) capabilities.
• Indrajaal: An AI-powered grid from a Hyderabad startup that combines jammers, spoofers, and intelligence to protect areas up to 4,000 sq km. Already deployed at naval sites in Gujarat and Karnataka.
• During the May 2025 swarm attacks, the IAF activated its Integrated Counter-UAS Grid, alongside conventional radars, guns, and missiles, neutralising attempted strikes on 15 military bases and several urban targets.

Conclusion

The future of warfare is here, and it’s unmanned, AI-driven and asymmetric. India’s response to the May 2025 drone swarms signals it is rapidly adapting to this future.

 

Editorial 2 : Fuel for a green Viksit Bharat

Context

India’s aspiration to be “viksit” by the centenary year of its independence, while adhering to the net zero carbon emissions target for 2070, needs a strategy for sustained per capita energy use.

To Focus on

• It needs to focus on achieving a Human Development Index of 0.95, which is characteristic of advanced countries, and provide clean energy for this purpose. This corresponds to around 28,000 TWh of total energy annually.
• The available clean energy sources to address this need are renewable energy, large hydro power and nuclear.
• Among them, nuclear energy’s contributionwould need to be at least around 20,000 TWh annually since the other two together are unlikely to exceed 8,000 TWh.
• Today, India consumes around 9,800 TWh annually with around 96 per cent coming from fossil resources.
• Clean energy needs to increase 70 times and around 70 per cent of it needs to come from nuclear in 45 years.

Nuclear energy

• After Independence, Homi Bhabha had advocated a three-stage nuclear power programmeaimed at long term energy security and autonomy for the country.
• Any nuclear programme has to necessarily begin with uranium— the only natural source of fissionable material.
• While our uranium resources were modest to begin with, the emphasis on exploration has led to an increase in stocks.
• The ore grades, however, are very low. These reserves, despite the higher cost they entail, are a key source of energy security, especially in a situation when uranium imports are disrupted.
• Access to foreign uranium markets has enabled the first-stage nuclear programme to grow well beyond 10 GWe, a threshold that was envisaged earlier. However, the second-stage programme of fast breeder reactors is yet to take off.

The PHWRs

• We must, however, celebrate our domestic pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs), the proven and competitive technology that meets global benchmarks.
• While the 100 GWe nuclear mission launched by the government would still leave us about twentyfold below the nuclear capacity required for a net zero “Viksit Bharat”, realising it within the specified timeframe requires accelerated deployment.
• This, in turn, depends essentially on proven technologies — domestic PHWRs being the primary workhorse, supplemented by proven large light water reactors (LWRs).
• We must also bring in multiple deployment agencies, beyond NPCIL and now NTPC.
• The PHWR technology must be seen as a common national good and made available to potential domestic agencies for accelerated deploymentwith a mentoring approach.
• Efforts to minimise the costs are necessary in the case of LWRs by following the Make in India approach.

Accelerating India’s Nuclear Energy Security

• A 100 GWe nuclear capacity needs 20,000 tons of uranium yearly—15% of global supply. This poses a major energy security risk. India’s three-stage programme can extract 60–70 times more energy by recycling fuel, making a shift to fast reactors urgent.
• Delays in fast breeder reactors make it vital to start using abundant thorium in PHWRs. This also helps prepare for the third stage with molten salt reactors (MSRs), even without full progress in stage two. MSRs and subcritical systems offer faster capacity growth.
• SMRs won’t scale before 2047 and will face uranium shortages. R&D should focus on thorium MSR-based SMRs and advanced stage-two and stage-three tech.
• Using thorium in PHWRs needs HALEU and proven fuel performance, which also boosts safety, economics, and security.

Conclusion

One should expect the 100 GWe nuclear mission to be a forerunner to the much larger nuclear energy deployment necessary for net zero Viksit Bharat and not reach a virtual dead end.