What to Read in The Hindu Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: Protection against misuse

Context

Punishing consensual adolescent sex goes against the true purpose of the POCSO Act.

Introduction

The POCSO Act, 2012 was made to ensure the protection of children from sexual offences. However, concerns have emerged about its misuse in consensual teenage relationships. Legal experts and courts are now urging for reforms to balance child protection with adolescent rights, especially when consensual sex between teens aged 16 to 18 is being criminalised.

Key Objective of the POCSO Act, 2012

• The main aim of the POCSO Actis to protect children from sexual offences.
• Children under the age of 18 are considered minors, and any sexual act with them is treated as an offence, even if consensual.

Calls for Reform: Concerns About Criminalising Teen Relationships

• Courts and child rights activists have raised concerns that adolescents (aged 15–18) in consensual relationships are being unfairly punished.
• Many cases involved voluntary romantic relationships, not abuse.
• There is a need to differentiate between exploitationand normal adolescent behavior.

Indira Jaising’s Submission to the Supreme Court

• Senior advocate Indira Jaising, appointed as amicus curiae, supported changes in the law.
• She argued that consensual sex between teenagers aged 16–18should not be considered a crime.
• She challenged the current legal age of consent (18 years).
• Suggested that the law should recognise that 16 is a common age of sexual maturity.
• Proposed changes to:
  • The POCSO Act
  • Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)

Risk of Misuse and Need for Balance

• Jaising noted that allowing exceptions for consensual adolescent sex would:
  • Prevent misuseof the law
  • Protect genuine victims
  • Preserve the original protective spiritof the Act

Law Commission’s 2023 Stand

• The Law Commissionopposed lowering the age of consent.
• Recommended judicial discretionin handling cases involving 16–18-year-olds in consensual relationships.

Relevant Legal Provisions

• Under the POCSO Act, Indian Penal Code, and BNS:
  • Any sexual act with someone under 18 is punishable, even with consent.
• Section 2(d) of POCSO defines anyone below 18 as a child, meaning their consent is legally invalid.

High Court’s Suggestion: Narrowing the Gap

• In 2021, the Madras High Court (Vijayalakshmi vs State Rep)advised:
  • In consensual relationships, the age gap should be less than five years.
  • This helps prevent older adults from taking advantage of impressionable teens.

Way Forward: Education Over Criminalisation

• There is a strong need to educate adolescentsabout the legal implications of sexual activity.
• Criminalising normal teenage behaviordoes not help in tackling real abuse.
• The focus should remain on preventing exploitation, not punishing consensual love.

Conclusion

To truly protect children, the law must distinguish between abuse and consensual adolescent behavior. Strict rules without context can harm young people in mutual relationships. Through legal reform, judicial discretion, and education, India can ensure that child safety is maintained while respecting the evolving maturity and rights of adolescents in today’s society.

 

Editorial 2: ​Understanding Russia’s Taliban gauntlet

Context

The logic behind Russia’s move to legitimise the Taliban continues to raise questions.

Introduction

On July 3, 2025, the Russian Foreign Ministry officially recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), marking the peak of Moscow’s gradual diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. This move came shortly after Russia agreed to upgrade bilateral ties and formally accredited Gul Hassan as the Taliban’s ambassador to Moscow. With the IEA flag now flying over the Afghan Embassy in the Russian capital, many are questioning the strategic motivations behind Russia’s decision to legitimise the Taliban regime.

A change, two decades later

Time Period / Event	Russia’s Approach and Actions	Key Highlights
1996–2001: Taliban’s First Rule (IEA 1.0)	– Refused to recognise Taliban govt. – Withdrew embassy in 1997. – Supported Northern Alliance militarily. – Helped Central Asian allies secure Afghan borders.	– Taliban seen as hostile. – Strong anti-Taliban stance. – Backed anti-Taliban regional coalitions.
2000: Chechnya Conflict	– Taliban recognised Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. – Urged jihad against Russia over Chechnya. – Estimated 2,500 Chechen fighters trained in Afghanistan. – Russia considered “preventive strikes”.	– Diplomatic relations hit a low. – Taliban viewed as direct threat to Russian national security.
Post-9/11 (2001–2003)	– Joined U.S. in UN sanctions against Taliban. – Supported Operation Enduring Freedom. – Listed Taliban as a terrorist organisation in 2003.	– Became part of global war on terror. – Coordinated with U.S. against Taliban.
Early 2010s: Shift in Strategy	– Built unofficial ties with Taliban. – Strengthened engagement with Pakistan. – Focused on counter-IS-K effortsand drug control. – Ensured protection of Russian citizens.	– Gradual pragmatic shift. – Taliban no longer seen as the sole enemy.
2010s–2020: Diplomatic Balancing	– Balanced between Afghan govt. and Taliban. – Hosted Moscow Format and intra-Afghan talks. – Taliban invited despite UN blacklist. – Sought to increase regional influence.	– Russia emerged as a diplomatic mediator. – Attempted to sideline U.S. presence.
2021: Taliban Takeover (IEA 2.0)	– Maintained embassy in Kabul. – Expressed confidence in Taliban governance. – Continued engagement despite regime change.	– Russia among few to maintain diplomatic continuity.
2022–2024: Growing Security Risks	– IS-K attacks on Russian interests: – Kabul Embassy bombing (2022) – Crocus City Hall attack, Moscow (2024) – Taliban blamed for failing to control terrorism. – No significant economic gainsdespite engagement.	– Security concerns deepened. – Economic cooperation remained unfulfilled. – Afghanistan still seen as potential trade corridor, but uncertainty remains.

Russia’s Recognition of the Taliban (IEA)

• Russia’s decision to recognise the IEAreflects its belief that the Taliban are the only stable force in control of Afghanistan.
• Moscow sees the Taliban as partners in fighting terrorism, especially against groups like IS-K.
• This perception led to the suspension of the banon Taliban activities in April 2025.

Legal and Security Concerns Still Remain

• Despite the recognition, the Russian Supreme Court only suspended, not fully removed, the ban on the Taliban.
• The Taliban are still listed as a terrorist groupin Russia’s unified federal register.
• This shows that Russia’s security establishment remains cautious, and the decision could be reversedif Taliban cooperation fails.

Limited Immediate Gains for Russia

• The recognition is mostly symbolic, offering no immediate benefitsto Russia in Afghanistan.
• Moscow’s influence in the regionmay not increase as a result of this move.
• While some Russian officials talk of arming the Taliban, it is uncertain how far Russia is willing to goin this partnership.

Regional Implications and Future Risks

• Russia’s move may encourage other countrieslike China and Central Asian states to also recognise the Taliban.
• The Taliban are expected to demand more from their partners, now that a major power has officially recognised them.
• Russia’s soft approachto the Taliban’s policies on inclusivity, women, and minority rights may set a pragmatic, value-neutral template for others in the region.

Conclusion

India is unlikely to be significantly impacted by Russia’s recent move. New Delhi has gradually strengthened its diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, especially through shared concerns over terrorism in Kashmir. India is expected to maintain dialogue, trade, and humanitarian aid with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), while continuing to withhold formal recognition. This approach of engagement without official recognition appears to remain the central path of India’s Afghanistan policy.