What to Read in Indian Express Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: No magic pill.

Context:

India faces the double burden of malnutrition persisting with obesity. The Semaglutide drug used for sugar control in diabetes is used in weight loss industry. It poses the risk of shifting the treatment of obesity as lifestyle disease to the drug-dependent condition.

Semaglutide drug and weight-loss industry:

• Even persons with healthy BMI suffer from unhealthy metabolism. This increases the risk of diabetes, fatty liver, heart disease.
• The weight-loss industry is majorly dominated by naturopathy, Ayurveda, yoga, and nutrition.
• Semaglutide, a specific drug in the class of GLP-1 receptor antagonists, is used for treating diabetes. It slows down digestion, helping patients to feel full for longer.
• This drug sis now being used for weight loss in the weight loss centers. They offer injections of Semaglutide, alongside diet and workout plans,  as a part of weight-management regimen.
• The weight-loss pills industry is expected to reach $100 billion by the end of this decade. Demand may also increase rapidly by the end of 2026 when its patent expires. There will be increased supply of generic drugs at affordable prices.

Positive and negative effects of using Semaglutide:

• This drug slows the metabolism in human body. It has positive health effects such as weight loss, improved blood sugar control, reduced risk of cardiovascular risks, fatty liver and inflammation markers.
• It also helps in restoring regular menstrual cycles, and ovulation in women with polycystic ovary syndrome. It may also improve fertility when combined with lifestyle interventions such as healthy diet and exercises.
• It has negative effects such as appetite loss, nausea, vomiting, and constipation. Serious health conditions such as gall bladder disease, pancreatitis, and kidney issues.
• It may also lead to thyroid tumors, muscle and lean mass loss, and rapid weight gain.
• Weight loss with Semaglutide costs around Rs.13, 000-16, 000 per kilogram loss and include strong metabolic benefits. Diet and structured exercise costs around Rs.5000-6000 per kilogram weight-lost and improves long-term habits such as walking and jogging.

Semaglutide as a part of public health campaign to reduce obesity:

• This drug is largely imported. Using it as first line drug for weight loss may shift the focus from cost effective public health campaigns focusing on diet, exercise, and preventive health and nutrition programmes.  Over-focus on this drug may crowd-out other cost effective alternative medicines.
• High dr4ug costs and shifting government resources from prevention programmes may increase urban-rural divide in obesity treatment. Elite urban classes may access costly drugs for weight loss treatment. Low income rural population may remain under-served with basic diabetes and obesity care.
• This may shift the focus from treating weigh loss as lifestyle or behavioral issue to a drug- dependent condition. This may discourage community- based health strategies such as healthy diets.

Way forward:

This drug must be selectively used for treatment of patients with obesity and diabetes risk coexisting. It must also be integrated in public health programmes. It should come under price control regime to make it available at affordable prices. This drug, when used effectively with lifestyle intervention, may reduce the obesity burden of India.

 

Editorial 2: Indus treaty and strategy

Context:

Recent terror attacks in Pahalgam have renewed the debates on the relevance of Indus water treaty. India has pressed for renegotiating a new treaty. Pakistan fears of losing the control over Indus River and its tributaries.

About Indus Water Treaty (IWT):

• India and Pakistan signed the IWT in 1960with World Bank as its guarantor. The treaty has survived for more than six decades despite four wars, cross-border terrorism and prolonged hostility with Pakistan.
• The Treaty divides the use of the six rivers of the Indus basin between India and Pakistan:
• Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej):They are allocated exclusively to India. India can use these waters for consumptive needs (irrigation, domestic use, hydropower, etc.) without restriction.
• Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab):They are allocated to Pakistan. India has limited rights, such as: It can use it for navigation, fishing, building Run-of-the-river hydropower projects with design restrictions. It also has the right of limited irrigation use (up to 701,000 acres) of its waters.
• Permanent Indus Commission:  It is a bilateral body to exchange data and resolve disputes.
• Dispute Resolution Mechanism: The IWT’s (Indus Waters Treaty) dispute resolution mechanism is a three-tiered process outlined in Article IX: the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) for initial discussions, followed by a Neutral Expertif the PIC fails, and finally, a Court of Arbitration for unresolved disputes.
• This structured approach is designed to facilitate cooperation and peaceful settlement of issues, though disagreements have arisen over its application and effectiveness.
• Financial Arrangements: India paid £62 million to Pakistan to help build replacement canals and reservoirs.

Two views of IWT:

• Division of water was based on geography, terrain, gravity and the natural course of the rivers and not on the volumetric assessment of the water. The IWT has always been interpreted differently by both sides.
• Indian View: A generous gesture by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who believed water, could become a source of cooperation. India gave away bulk of the waters to Pakistan despite being the upper riparian.
• Pakistani View: The Treaty is inadequate and unfair. Pakistan harbors deep insecurity that India could manipulate flows of the western rivers, especially during the sowing season, to harm its agriculture.
• While Pakistan received control over 80% of the basin waters, India retained strategic control as the upper riparian state.

Pakistan’s Insecurity and Strategy:

• Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus system is near total, with agriculture and livelihoods linked directly to river flows.
• It repeatedly objects to Indian hydropower projects on the western rivers, such as Kishanganga and Ratle in Jammu & Kashmir.
• Islamabad’s strategy has been to internationalize disputes, dragging India frequently to Neutral Experts and Arbitration Courts.
• By framing India’s legitimate projects as violations, Pakistan sustains the narrative of “water insecurity” and keeps tensions alive.
• Pakistan wants the control over river flows. The Jammu and Kashmir issue between Indi and Pakistan is still not resolved due to Pakistan’s deep insecurity about water flow.
• Most of these rivers flow from J&K before entering Pakistan.  Its desire to annex Kashmir is not only due to its territorial ambitions or religious motivations but also due to its desire to control Indus water and its tributaries.
• Despite the wars, cross border terrorism, treaty has survived for so long because India acted as a responsible upper-riparian state by not interrupting smooth water flow into the lower-riparian state Pakistan.

India’s Strategic Advantage:

• Despite the generosity of the Treaty, India retains important levers of control over these rivers.
• Upper Riparian Control: India can influence timing of flows by regulating reservoirs on western rivers within treaty limits.
• Hydropower Development: India is allowed to build run-of-the-river projects, which, if maximized, can enhance energy security in J&K and Ladakh.
• Diplomatic Leverage: In times of crisis (e.g., after the Uri and Pulwama attacks), India has hinted at reviewing or even suspending aspects of the Treaty to pressure Pakistan.
• So far, India has chosen restraint, prioritizing stability over coercion. However, experts argue that India must fully utilize its entitlements under the Treaty rather than leaving capacity unused

Way forward:

The Indus Waters Treaty represents a paradox: a symbol of cooperation amid hostility, but also a persistent source of friction. For India, the way forward lies in exercising its rights fully within the Treaty, investing in infrastructure, and using its riparian advantage as both a development tool and a diplomatic lever. For Pakistan, reconciliation with geographic reality may finally be the only path toward stability. At over six decades old, the Treaty still stands as a model of resilience, but its future will be determined by how both nations align their strategies with the realities of water, security, and climate change.