What to Read in The Hindu Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

 

Editorial 1: The rebounding of Pakistan’s Afghan strategy

Context

The return of the Taliban has made Afghanistan a ‘strategic ditch’ for Pakistan’s security establishment.

 

Introduction

On December 27, 2024, the Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said that 383 officers and soldiers in the Pakistani security forces had lost their lives in counter-terrorism operations during 2024. He also claimed that 925 terrorists and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists had been eliminated in approximately 60,000 intelligence-based operations. Giving a detailed account of Pakistan’s generosity towards Afghanistan, he nonetheless asserted that Pakistan would not allow its citizens to be targeted by the TTP, which is alleged to enjoy safe haven in Afghanistan. It is, however, ironic given that Pakistan has itself, for long, provided logistical, military and moral support to the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network, the two formerly insurgent-cum-terrorist groups now leading the outcaste regime in Kabul, during their fight against the West-backed Afghan government and American security forces.

• Pakistan’s special representative for Afghanistan Muhammad Sadiq Khan had visited Kabul in December 2024,
  1. where he had held parleys with top-ranking Taliban leaders to de-escalate the tensions between two countries.
• But this is likely to be a diplomatic failure as it was during his stay in Kabul that the Pakistan Air Force conducted air strikes against alleged TTP targets in eastern Paktika province on December 24.
• The Afghan authorities claimed that 46 people were killed in the air strikes which were apparently in response to the TTP’s attack, on December 21, on a security post in South Waziristan, killing 16 Pakistani soldiers.

 

Getting into a deeper mess

• The two countries seem to be locked in a dangerous stalemate: On December 28, Afghanistan’s so-called Ministry of Defence claimed attacks on multiple locations inside Pakistan in retaliation for the air strikes.
• Ministry’s strategic omission: Interestingly, the ministry did not mention the fact that Pakistan’s territory was targeted, but, instead, chose to highlight that the strikes were executed beyond the ‘hypothetical line’ — a term used by the Afghan government to refer to the Durand Line.
• Limits of Pakistan’s influence: These incidents serve to highlight the limits of Pakistan’s ability to exercise its influence over its former proxy by virtue of either coercive methods or diplomatic persuasion.

 

Strategic Missteps and Consequences

• Pakistan’s Afghan strategy falters: Pakistan’s Afghan strategy has now become a victim of its own success.
• From “strategic depth” to “strategic ditch”: Instead of evolving as a “strategic depth” for Pakistan, the return of the Taliban has made Afghanistan a “strategic ditch” for Pakistan’s security establishment, which seems to be getting deeper and deeper with no sight of escape.
• Tit-for-tat killings worsen relations: The tit-for-tat killing frenzy has dangerous implications as Pakistan’s already tense relationship with Afghanistan has plunged into a deep crisis.

 

Challenges from the TTP

• Shared ideological affinities: Pakistan has been facing significant challenges from the TTP, which shares many ideological affinities with the Afghan Taliban, leading to a growing perception that both constitute the sides of the same coin.
• Public pressure for action: Against a backdrop of inflamed passions and growing suspicion, Pakistan has been under constant public pressure to demonstrate retaliatory action.
• Irony of seeking U.S. assistance: Nothing could be more ironic and ridiculous than the entreaties from a section of the Pakistani government to Washington to come to its rescue.

 

Controversial Measures and Statements

• Proposed U.S. intervention: In response to the deadly attack on a military camp in Pakistan in December 2023, claimed by the Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), Balochistan’s caretaker Information Minister, Jan Achakzai, suggested the Pakistan government propose offering U.S. “drone bases” to target militant sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
• Deleted proposal: Other measures included “special targeted operations,” air strikes, border closure with Afghanistan, return of Afghan refugees, and anti-TTA [Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan] political opposition gathering in Islamabad. However, Mr. Achakzai later deleted this controversial tweet.
• General’s aggressive remark: When Pakistan’s Army chief, General Asim Munir, had callously asserted in January 2024 that, “When it comes to the safety and security of every single Pakistani, the whole of Afghanistan can be damned,” it merely fed the narrative that Pakistan’s security establishment is largely ignorant of the subtleties required to persuade the Afghan Taliban by means other than firepower.
• Later conciliatory tone: It is another matter that in a conciliatory tone afterwards, Gen. Munir pleaded with Afghan rulers not to prioritise the TTP “over their long-standing and benevolent brother Islamic country.”

 

Misjudgment and Historical Oversight

• Fantasy land of Pakistan’s ruling elite: When it comes to Afghanistan’s messy political dynamics, Pakistan’s ruling elite has been living in a fantasy land, ignoring Afghanistan’s notoriety as a ‘graveyard of empires.’
• Missed opportunity post-9/11: Instead of trying to extract Pakistan from the Afghan conflict after 9/11, Rawalpindi overstretched its involvement, chasing a wild dream of an unbreakable Pakistan-Afghan alliance against India.
• The unexpected explosion: An explosion was bound to happen, but Pakistan was extremely slow to react to the gathering threats. Perhaps the only surprise is that this explosion came out of the Taliban-led Kabul, which was supposed to be a pliant regime.
• Misjudgment of Taliban-TTP nexus: It is shocking that Pakistan got the Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus utterly wrong.

 

The creator of its own terror problem

• A problem of Pakistan’s own making: The terrorism problem that Pakistan faces is one that is of its own making.
• Afghan policy and India obsession: It is Pakistan’s Afghan policy and the unnecessary obsession about a threat from India which should be blamed for fuelling jihadist extremism and terrorism.
• Support for extremist groups: Pakistan has been pursuing an ill-considered policy of supporting violent extremist groups that are seen as capable of hurting India and keeping Kabul under its thumb.

 

Misjudgment of the Afghan Taliban

• Taliban as a chess piece: Pakistan’s military was not oblivious to the Afghan Taliban’s intransigence. Rather, it viewed the Taliban as an expedient chess piece in the great game against India.
• Imran Khan’s misguided celebration: Imran Khan, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister, now in prison for defying the powerful military, had compared the Taliban’s return to Afghans having “broken the shackles of slavery.”

 

Realpolitik and Ideological Rigidities

• Excitement gives way to realpolitik: The initial excitement over the Taliban’s recapture of Kabul has been overshadowed by the inexorable realpolitik and the ideological rigidities of the Taliban movement.
• Confusion and paralysis in Pakistan: The outcome is unsurprising confusion and paralysis for those in Pakistan who are tasked with reconciling the military and political aspects of their response. should fit together.

 

A pushback

• Historical rejection of the Durand Line: No Afghan regime has ever accepted the 1893 Durand Line as a legitimate border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• Kabul's territorial claims: Kabul claims Pakistan’s Pashtun territories near the border.
• Boundary issues in conflict zones: The problem with international boundaries in conflict zones is that they are not red lines inscribed on stone.
• Pakistan’s past complicity: After all, it was Rawalpindi which was complicit with the mujahideen in violating the very sanctity of the Durand Line during the so-called Afghan jihad against the Red Army.

 

Taliban’s Opposition and Pashtunistan Issue

• Shock from Taliban’s stance: The Afghan Taliban’s fierce opposition to border fencing has come as a shock to Pakistan, which was hopeful that the return of the Taliban would also bury the demand for a ‘greater Pashtunistan’.
• Pashtunistan concept: The idea of creating a Pashtun homeland by uniting the frontier region of Pakistan with Afghanistan was a central aspect of the greater Pashtunistan demand.
• Resurgence of Pashtun nationalism: The Taliban have not done anything to suppress Pashtun nationalism with Islamist ideology, instead, they have been fuelling Pashtun nationalist sentiments against Pakistan.

 

Islamabad’s Pashtunistan Puzzle

• Not a new issue: Of course, Islamabad’s ‘Pashtunistan’ puzzle is not new, but given the vicious potential of the militants that Pakistani security forces are now facing, the stakes of resolving the puzzle are much higher.
• Taliban’s provocative stance: If not meant as an intentionally sarcastic snipe, the Afghan Taliban’s disdainful refusal to treat Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a Pakistani province is tantamount to calling for Pashtun unity, which is going to exacerbate Pakistan’s fears about Afghan irredentism.
• Challenges to border fencing: In all probability, the Afghan border security personnel will continue to challenge Pakistani attempts to fence the border.
• Exacerbation of fears: The reality of confronting irredentism is often far messier, which further complicates the already fraught Afghanistan-Pakistan relations.
• In all probability, the Afghan border security personnel will continue to challenge Pakistani attempts to fence the border.

 

Conclusion

Given the alarming rise in terrorism being blamed on the Afghan Taliban’s inaction, Pakistan is reluctant to unilaterally recognise the new regime in Kabul as it had done previously in early 1990s. The magnitude of the challenge posed by the TTP to the legitimacy and authority of the Pakistani state, along with the utter disregard of the Afghan Taliban to Pakistan’s persistent demands for credible action against the TTP, may have left Rawalpindi with diminishing options to create the terms for political engagement with the Taliban-led Afghanistan.

 

Editorial 2: More flexibility, but also greater challenges

 

Context

The accelerated and extended degree programmes herald a transformative shift in Indian education but also raise many questions.

 

Introduction

The latest guidelines of the University Grants Commission (UGC) herald a transformative shift in higher education in India. Among other reforms, the UGC has introduced an accelerated degree programme and an extended degree programme for undergraduate students, which will allow them to complete their degrees either earlier or later than the standard duration.

 

Advantages and challenges

• Creation of a globally competitive educational framework: This new paradigm aims to create a globally competitive educational framework that allows students greater autonomy and flexibility in charting out their academic trajectory.
• Revolutionary in India’s rigid system: In a rigid education system such as India’s, this approach is particularly revolutionary.

 

Advantages of Accelerated and Extended Degree Programmes

• Benefits of accelerated degree programmes: While an accelerated degree programme will be advantageous for students who are keen to join the workforce quickly, gain early professional experience, or save money on tuition fees,
• Benefits of extended degree programmes: The extended degree programme will allow students the leeway to explore a broader range of subjects, undertake internships, engage in research projects, travel, learn new skills, and balance academic pursuits with personal and professional commitments.
• Alignment with NEP 2020: As the National Education Policy (NEP), 2020 advocates for a multidisciplinary approach to learning, this approach could produce graduates who are not only proficient in their chosen fields, but are also equipped with more soft skills, creative skills, and ideas for innovation.

 

Enhancing Student Mobility and Autonomy

• Global alignment for greater mobility: By aligning the structure of undergraduate education with international standards, the reforms aim to create greater mobility for Indian students, both within India and abroad.
• Flexible credit system: The flexible credit system introduced under these reforms will allow students to progress at their own pace. They can tailor their academic experiences to their specific needs, interests, and future career goals.
• Importance of autonomy: This autonomy is crucial for the students’ overall development and success.

 

Challenges and Concerns

• Depth and rigour of accelerated programmes: However, there are challenges. The accelerated format raises questions about the depth and rigour of the education provided to students. If students are taught the same curriculum within a shorter period of time, they may have a superficial understanding of key concepts, which could compromise educational outcomes.
• Lack of urgency in extended programmes: In contrast, students who opt for the extended degree programme may lack academic urgency. Some may take longer than necessary to complete their studies, which would diminish the value of the degree.

 

Adapting to the new structure

• Difficulty in adapting engineering education: It is especially difficult for technical education to adapt to the new structure, as engineering programmes demand a deep understanding of both theory and practice.
• Traditional structure for specialised education: While the push for interdisciplinary education is beneficial for students, engineering programmes are traditionally structured to provide students with a specialised education that prepares them for specific career paths.

 

Risks of Accelerated Engineering Degrees

• Oversimplification of technical learning: Accelerated engineering degrees could risk oversimplifying technical learning. Engineering degrees require an in-depth study of subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and advanced engineering principles.
• Reduced time for practical work: Compressing this content could reduce the time available for practical projects, lab work, tutorial sessions, and project work and internships, all of which are crucial for developing the technical competencies required in the field.
• Impact on problem-solving skills: Engineering students are often required to solve real-world problems, and any pressure to finish their studies quickly may hinder their ability to master problem-solving techniques that are integral to their profession.

 

Challenges of Extended Degree Options

• Financial burden for extended programmes: Conversely, while the extended degree option in engineering could provide students with more opportunities for specialisation, research, and practical experience, it may also be more of a financial burden for students.
• Discouragement for economically constrained students: The extended programme could discourage students who already face economic constraints, making higher education even less accessible for some.

 

Practical issues

• Substantial restructuring required: The transition to accelerated and extended degree formats requires substantial restructuring of curricula, teaching methods, and approval from competent bodies of universities and administrative systems.
• Resource constraints in universities: This could be daunting for universities that already face resource constraints.
• Digital divide concerns: The shift towards greater digitalisation in education, which is likely to accompany these reforms, could deepen the digital divide.

 

Need for Robust Administrative Systems

• Tracking student progress: The introduction of accelerated and extended degrees necessitates robust systems for tracking student progress, evaluation, managing credit transfers, and ensuring the appropriate recognition of academic achievements.
• Complex administrative frameworks: Institutions will need to develop sophisticated administrative frameworks to manage these complexities effectively.
• Struggles of underprivileged students: The equity implications of these reforms are concerning. Students from underprivileged backgrounds may struggle to navigate the new system without adequate guidance and support, potentially leading to higher drop-out rates if they are unable to catch up.

 

Faculty Adaptation Challenges

• Need for professional development: The adaptation of faculty to these new pedagogical models is another potential obstacle. Teachers will need to undergo professional development to adjust to the demands of flexible, interdisciplinary curricula.
• Success dependent on educators: The success of these reforms hinges not only on the students’ ability to navigate the new systems but also on the capacity of educators to support them effectively.

 

Conclusion

If these challenges are addressed with strategic planning, adequate investment, timely recruitment of faculty and staff, and a commitment to inclusivity, these reforms could lay the foundation for a more dynamic higher education system, which is better aligned to market needs, and would help India realise the dream of Viksit Bharat by 2047.