What to Read in The Hindu Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: Revisit digital search powers under the I-T Bill 2025

Context

The idea of allowing access to a person’s online digital space brings up serious worries about privacy, government overreach, and constant monitoring.

Introduction

The Finance Minister recently put forward a proposal in Parliament, as part of the Income-Tax Bill, 2025, that would let tax officials access a person’s “virtual digital space” during search and seizure operations. The main reason given is that since financial activities are now mostly online, tax enforcement should also go digital. However, this view ignores the deeper consequences of such a move, which raises serious concerns about privacy, excessive authority, and constant surveillance.

A blurring, open-ended

Aspect	Current Law (Income-Tax Act, 1961)	Proposed Changes (Income-Tax Bill, 2025)	Concerns Raised
Scope of Search	Allows search and seizure under Section 132, but only in physical spaces like houses, offices, and lockers.	Extends powers to cover a person’s “virtual digital space” such as emails, cloud storage, and social media accounts.	Privacy risks increase due to access to vast and often unrelated digital content.
Basis of Search	Search must be linked to suspected undisclosed income or assets, found in physical places.	This clear link is weakened; digital spaces are broader and not always related to financial wrongdoing.	Raises questions of overreach and lack of clear purpose in digital access.
Definition of Digital Space	Not applicable.	Includes emails, cloud drives, apps, social media, and “any other similar space” – a vague and open-endedterm.	The broad definition creates a risk of misuse or undefined limits.
Stakeholders Affected	Searches affect only the individualunder investigation.	Digital data may include others’ information – friends, family, clients, or professional contacts.	Could lead to unintended privacy breaches for unrelated people.
Authority Powers	Access was limited to physical keys and locations.	Tax officers can now override passwords or access codes to enter devices or online accounts.	It’s unclear how this will work, especially with encrypted platforms like WhatsApp.
Impact on Professionals	Professionals like journalists were not directly targeted in searches.	Sensitive data like unpublished stories, confidential sources, or private communication could be exposed.	May threaten journalistic freedom and professional confidentiality.
Legal Safeguards	Courts require clear evidence, and the term “reason to believe” demands substantial material.	No additional safeguards provided in the Bill for digital searches.	Violates the principle that search and seizure is a serious breach of privacy.
Judicial View	Supreme Court treats privacy as fundamental and insists on strict application of search powers.	In 2023, SC issued interim guidelineson digital seizures and asked the government to create proper protocols.	The Bill may ignore these directions, increasing the risk of legal conflict.

Gaps in the Proposed Provision (Income-Tax Bill, 2025)

• The proposed law lacks judicial oversight, clear limits, and protective safeguards.
• It shows a poor understandingof the depth and sensitive nature of digital data.
• Electronic devices today store layered personal, professional, and confidential content, which the law fails to account for.
• The provision prohibits disclosureof the “reason to believe”, directly going against principles of transparency and accountability.
• It may lead to unchecked intrusionby authorities without any external scrutiny or procedural balance.

Global Best Practices in Digital Search & Privacy

• Canada: Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedomsprotects against “unreasonable search or seizure” and requires:
  • Prior authorisation
  • Approval by a neutral judicial authority
  • Reasonable and probable groundsfor search
• United States:
  • The Taxpayer Bill of Rightsensures all enforcement actions are lawful and not overly intrusive.
  • The S. Supreme Courtruling in Riley vs California mandates a warrant before accessing digital data due to its deeply personal nature.
• These standards highlight the need for statutory protections, due process, and proportional enforcement—something the Indian proposal currently does not reflect.

Key Issues with India’s Proposed Income Tax Provision

• The proposed law allows broad accessto a person’s digital personal data.
• There is no need for a warrant, no relevance filter, and no separationbetween financial and non-financial
• This approach risks violating individual privacyby treating all digital content as fair game.
• It lacks judicial checksand offers no protective safeguards to prevent misuse.

Violation of Supreme Court’s Privacy Standards

• In the landmark case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs Union of India, the Supreme Courtlaid down a four-part test for privacy restrictions:
  • The action must pursue a legitimate aim.
  • It must be necessaryto achieve that aim.
  • It must use the least intrusive method
  • It must satisfy the principle of proportionality.
• The new tax proposal fails this test, as it allows unfettered accessto personal digital data without judicial oversight, and does not use the least intrusive means.

Way forward

The way forward is not to reject digital enforcement, but to ensure it is grounded in the principles of proportionality, legality, and transparency. As India moves towards a more digitised tax framework, it is essential that individual privacy is not sacrificed in the name of regulatory control. Surveillance without clear checks and accountability does not strengthen governance—it leads to overreach and potential misuse of power.

Conclusion

There is still room for correction. The Select Committee currently examining the Bill has the opportunity to address these concerns meaningfully. It can do so by narrowing the definition of ‘virtual digital space’, ensuring that judicial warrants are required before access is granted, and by making it mandatory to state clear reasons for such digital intrusion. Just as importantly, there must be a proper redress system for individuals whose rights are violated. In a democracy, strengthening enforcement should never come at the cost of fundamental freedoms.

 

Editorial 2: A year later — colonial-era laws to new criminal codes

Context

Technology has been helpful, but getting feedback from investigating officers (IOs) is important, as they play a key rolein using these tools effectively.

Introduction

It has been almost a year since the three new criminal laws came into effect, replacing the old British-era laws. Last year, the central government replaced the Indian Penal Code with the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) with the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA).

• Policemenare slowly getting familiar with the new laws and their provisions.
• Most First Information Reports (FIRs)are now registered using the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), which is a key part of the Inter-operable Criminal Justice System (ICJS).
• A smooth transitionfrom the old laws to the new laws is essential, especially at the police station
• Zero FIRsare now being sent to the correct police stations within the same State through the CCTNS.
• The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)deserves credit for this achievement.
• A major improvement in policing is the introduction of the ‘e-Sakshya’ mobile app, which helps collect and save evidencein real time.
• This app was developed by the National Informatics Centre (NIC)in collaboration with the MHA.
• The NICis also responsible for running the ICJS, which links police, forensic labs (FSLs), prosecution, jails, and courts.
• While shifting to the new laws is mostly a technical process, the ‘e-Sakshya’ appis creating a real impact in everyday policing.
• Feedbackfrom investigating officers (IOs), who are leading the implementation of the new laws, is very important.

Mandatory recording of pictures and videos

• The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS)makes it mandatory for investigating officers (IOs) to record certain steps using audio-video tools. In some cases, using such tools is optional.
• The ‘e-Sakshya’ appsupports six key provisions of the BNSS, including:
  • Section 105: Recording search and seizurethrough audio-video
  • Section 185: Recording search by a police officer.
  • Section 176: Videographyof the scene of crime.
  • Section 173: Recording statementsof witnesses.
  • Section 180: Another provision for recording statements.
  • Section 497: Handling custody and disposal of propertyduring trial.
• Though trialsunder the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for serious crimes are still going on, IOs are already finding the ‘e-Sakshya’ app
• The app allows them to take photos and videos on the spot, with location (geo-coordinates)and time stamps, making the process transparent.
• For the public, this brings more trustin how search and seizure operations are done.
• Capturing witnesses on videoensures they can’t later deny being present at the crime scene.
• The app also prevents IOsfrom informally sending subordinates to conduct investigations on their behalf.
• The ‘selfie’ featurein the app acts as a check, improving the accountability and quality of investigation.
• As per Section 176 of BNSS, a forensic expert must visitthe crime scene, and this rule is helping improve evidence collection.
• Though the forensic systemhasn’t changed much in the past year, IOs now ensure the presence of an FSL expertat the scene.
• The use of police dogsat crime scenes is also helping in tracking suspects.
• The government’s plan to set up a Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL)and a National Forensic Science University (NFSU) in Raipur, Chhattisgarh, announced by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, will further strengthen forensic infrastructure.

Pending Challenges in Implementation

• Despite progress, more improvementsare still needed in using the ‘e-Sakshya’ app
• Photos and videoscaptured through the app are stored in Sakshya Lockers on the National Government Cloud (NGC).
• However, courts are not yet directly accessingthis evidence through the Inter-operable Criminal Justice System (ICJS).
• Investigating Officers (IOs)often copy data via CCTNS and submit it using pen drives or other devices, along with the final case report.
• While this doesn’t affect the authenticityof the evidence, it leads to duplicate work and unnecessary spending on storage devices.

Device & Access Issues

• Many IOs still use their personal mobile phonesfor capturing evidence.
• Those without Android phones (Version 10 or higher)had to purchase new phones, as the app needs at least 1 GB of storage.
• Some police stations have received only one tablet, which is not enough since there are multiple IOsper station.

Functionality Limits in the App

• Each video can be up to 4 minutes, but there is no limiton the number of videos that can be captured.
• If an FIR is linked, poor-quality images/videoscannot be deleted or re-recorded.
• If an FIR is not linked, the media can be deletedand re-captured, but only five Sakshya IDs (SIDs) can be generated offline.
• In offline mode, data must be uploaded once in network rangeto free up space for new evidence.

Reluctance of the Accused & Practical Difficulties

• Accused personsoften hesitate to be recorded when showing spots where weapons or drugs are hidden.
• Despite such hesitation, ‘e-Sakshya’ is proving to be a game-changerin ensuring better investigations and stronger convictions.

Legal Safeguards and Technical Gaps

• The app generates a hash value(via SHA256) and a certificate to validate secondary electronic evidence.
• However, in cybercrime cases, expert opinion is required for handling electronic seizures.
• Some State Forensic Labs, like the one in Chhattisgarh, are yet to be notifiedunder the IT Act, delaying the setup of cyber forensic labs.

Ambiguities in Registration of Offences

• Under Section 303(1)of the BNS, thefts below ₹5000 are often not treated as cognisable offences due to unclear wording.
• On the other hand, petty organised crimes(e.g., gambling) are being registered under Section 112, even though the definition is vague and open-ended.

Use of Technology for Evidence and Medical Reports

• Section 530 of BNSSallows evidence and witness examination (including IOs) via video conferencing, but this is not yet widely used.
• IOs are happy with the seven-day deadlinefor medical exam reports of rape survivors under Section 184 of BNSS.
• However, they still face delaysin getting post-mortem reports on time.
• The MedLEaPRsystem (by NIC Haryana) is under testing in Chhattisgarh, aiming to enable faster digital transmission of medical and post-mortem reports to the police via CCTNS.

Conclusion

Since all States and Union Territories are now following the new laws, it is important to get feedback to check how easy they are to use and fix any problems faced by investigating officers (IOs) and legal issues in courts. Also, more money and support should be given for forensics and technology. This will help ensure that IOs don’t have to use their own phones or devices for work and that every district has its own mobile forensic lab unit.