What to Read in The Hindu Editorial( Topic and Syllabus wise)

Editorial 1: ​​​​Power grab

Context

Gen. Munir’s quiet power grab in Pakistan may ultimately turn against him.

Introduction

The 27th Amendment marks a turning point in Pakistan’s politics, openly cementing the military’s dominance over a weakened democratic order. By empowering Gen. Asim Munir through sweeping structural changes — from creating the Chief of Defence Forces to granting lifetime immunity — the amendment reshapes institutions, reduces judicial independence, and signals a new era of centralised military authority.

Pakistan’s 27th Constitutional Amendment

Growing dominance of the military

• The 27th Amendment, passed on November 13, formalises the long-standing reality of military dominance over Pakistan’s political system.
• Asim Munir, the current Army Chief, has been steadily centralising authority.
• The Shehbaz Sharif-led coalitionfunctions largely under his influence and approval.

Elevation and rank restructuring

• After a brief India–Pakistan conflict in May, the government elevated Gen. Munir to Field Marshal— Pakistan’s second-ever five-star officer after Ayub Khan.
• The amendment solidifies his long-term influence through institutional changes.

Key Constitutional and Institutional Changes

Major revisions under Article 243

• A new post, Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), is created to command the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
• The Army Chief will simultaneously serveas the new Chief of Defence Forces, making the role immensely powerful.

Control of nuclear command

• Establishes a Commander of the National Strategic Commandfor oversight of nuclear and strategic assets.
• Appointment made by the Prime Minister on the Army Chief’s recommendation— reinforcing military dominance in nuclear policy.

Life-long immunity and tenure

• Officers promoted to five-star rankreceive:
  • Lifetime immunityfrom criminal prosecution.
  • Permanent military service, remaining in uniform until death.
  • Removal only through a process similar to impeachment under Article 47.
• This currently applies solely to  Munir, making him a legally protected power centre.
• The Presidentalso enjoys similar immunity protections.

Key Structural Changes Introduced by the 27th Amendment

Area Reformed	Previous System	After 27th Amendment
Top Military Command	Separate chiefs for Army, Navy, Air Force	Creation of Chief of Defence Forces overseeing all three, held by Army Chief
Strategic/Nuclear Command	National Command Authority under mixed civilian-military control	Commander of National Strategic Command appointed on Army Chief’s recommendation
Judicial Authority	Supreme Court final interpreter of Constitution	New Constitutional Court with govt-appointed judges
Five-star Rank Status	Not permanent; no immunity	Lifetime rank, full immunity, removal only via impeachment-like process
Civil-Military Balance	Some institutional checks	Significant shift toward military supremacy

Impact on Judiciary

Diminishing independence

• The Supreme Court loses its authority to interpret the Constitution.
• A new Constitutional Court, with judges appointed by the government, replaces this role.
• Several senior judges have resigned in protest, signalling erosion of judicial autonomy.

Democratic Backsliding

Historical context

• Pakistan’s democratic institutions were always fragile but occasionally resisted authoritarian overreach.
• Civil society and political actors historically reclaimed some democratic space during crises.

Current scenario

• The present ruling class appears unusually willing to concede ground to the military.
• Imran Khanremains the only major political figure openly challenging Gen. Munir but has been imprisoned for over two years.
• With the opposition weakened and leadership jailed, Gen. Munir’s authority expands unhindered.

 

Risks and Future Outlook

Underlying vulnerabilities

• Pakistan is grappling with:
  • A growing insurgency in tribal areas,
  • Deteriorating ties with India and Afghanistan,
  • Continuing public mobilisation by Imran Khan’s PTI,
  • Severe economic distress.

Potential blowback

• Munir has effectively carried out an indirect coup, relying on a compliant political class.
• Pakistan’s history shows that military strongmen eventually face decline, often triggered by political, economic, or security crises.
• Given the current instability, his centralisation of power may backfire sooner rather than later.

Conclusion
The amendment strengthens Gen. Munir’s grip but exposes Pakistan to long-term instability. With rising insurgency, poor economic conditions, and fractured civilian politics, over-centralisation may trigger unexpected backlash. History shows Pakistan’s military strongmen eventually face decline. By undermining democratic checks and empowering one individual, the country risks deepening its crises and accelerating the eventual collapse of this militarised power structure.

 

Editorial 2 : ​​​The need for a social audit for SIR 2.0

Context

The ongoing Special Intensive Revision exercise lacks proper rules, oversight, scrutiny, and auditing mechanisms.

Introduction

Commenting on the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) Special Intensive Revision (SIR) 2.0 across 12 States and UTs, The Hindu editorial noted that the experience in Bihar indicates the process may risk disenfranchising a large number of people. It added that as the exercise progresses, civil society, the media, and political parties must maintain strong vigilance to safeguard the integrity of India’s electoral democracy.

Key Issues Emerging from the Bihar SIR Experience

• The recent Special Intensive Revision (SIR)of Bihar’s electoral roll involved a documentation-heavy, re-verification process that sparked concerns about mass disenfranchisement and the quiet introduction of a citizenship-screening mechanism.
• The resulting revised electoral rollsshow serious anomalies—such as a sharp fall in the adult-elector ratio, disproportionate deletions of women and Muslim voters, and the presence of duplicate and bogus entries—indicating that disenfranchisement has already occurred.
• The Election Commission of India (ECI)has faced criticism for its conduct during the Bihar SIR, with its court submissions and public statements suggesting a growing resistance to scrutiny, reduced institutional accountability, and a greater focus on defending its authority rather than ensuring an inclusive and accurate electoral roll.
• The Supreme Court, while overseeing the legality of the process, has avoided addressing the fundamental issueof whether the ECI possesses the legal authority to conduct an SIR or whether any Rulesexist to govern it. Its limited interventions corrected only minor procedural gaps, allowing systemic flaws to persist, thereby risking the validation of an unwarranted and discriminatory framework that disproportionately impacts minority and marginalised groups.
• A further challenge relates to voting rights of internal migrants, especially acute in Tamil Nadu.
  • Under Section 19of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, electoral inclusion requires that a person be an “ordinarily resident” in a constituency.
  • Section 20, which defines this term, is outdated and fails to reflect the realities of modern migration patterns—such as long-term migrants, short-term/seasonal migrants, and circular migrants—resulting in significant gaps in ensuring their electoral inclusion.

Need for Social Audit in Electoral Roll Revision

• The current Special Intensive Revision (SIR)lacks proper Rules, oversight, scrutiny, and audit, underscoring the need for a mandatory social audit in electoral roll revision and verification.
• Social auditsin India are an established tool of participatory democracy, enabling communities to review and verify activities undertaken in their name, including the entire cycle of a public process.
• The Constitution, through Articles 243A and 243J, empowers community-based monitoring and auditing; over time, social audits have become legally institutionalised.
• The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)has also endorsed social audits as essential for monitoring mass programmes, prescribing detailed processes and procedures.
• Since India’s electoral system is founded on universal adult franchise, every eligible citizen must be present on the electoral roll; however, the present SIR lacks checks and balances, making it vulnerable to external influence and errors.
• Expecting all voters to repeatedly apply or reapply, or to furnish fresh proof of citizenship, is impracticalin a country where 30–40% of voters already do not turn out. This reflects an abdication of responsibility by the ECI in preparing accurate rolls.
• A mandatory social auditensures that additions and deletions in the roll are transparent, community-verified, and inclusive.

Social Audit as the Most Inclusive and Reliable Method

• A social auditinvolves open, collective examination of base documents and records, supported by public testimonies, enabling people to verify or contest the information in the electoral rolls.
• Conducting social audits at the panchayat, ward, or booth levelensures the most intensive, transparent, and community-driven revision of electoral rolls, minimising manipulation and maximising inclusion.
• This method has strong precedent: in 2003, when  M. Lyngdohwas the Chief Election Commissioner, the ECI—acting on inputs from citizens’ groups—directed decentralised social audits in gram sabhas and ward sabhas across five poll-bound States.
• Using the booth-level officer’s updated rolls as the base, the process produced significant corrections; for instance, over 7 lakh changes were made in Rajasthan alone, demonstrating the effectiveness of community-driven verification.
• The success of this earlier model reinforces that people-centred auditingis the best safeguard for an accurate, inclusive, and reliable electoral roll.

Conclusion

The ECI would do well to adopt this approach and formulate clear Rules — including a mandatory social audit — in consultation with civil society and political parties before moving ahead with SIR 2.0. This is essential to protect the integrity of India’s electoral democracy.